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Uncertainty assessments for imprecise previsions based on coherence
and related concepts require that the suprema of certain random num-
bers (interpreted as gains) are non-negative. The extreme situation that
a supremum is zero represents what is called a Weak Dutch Book (WDB)
in a betting interpretation language. While most of the previous dedicated
literature focused on WDBs for de Finetti’s coherence with precise prob-
abilities, in this paper we analyse the properties of WDBs with imprecise
previsions, notably for conditional (Williams’) coherent lower previsions.
We show that WDB assessments ensure a certain ‘local precision’ prop-
erty and imply, in the agent’s evaluation, some kind of ‘protection’ against
real losses. Further, these properties vary with the consistency notion we
adopt, tending to vanish with weaker ones. A generalisation of the clas-
sical strict coherence and other alternative approaches to WDBs are also
discussed.
Keywords. Weak Dutch Books,(Williams’) coherent lower previsions, de
Finetti’s coherence, strict consistency
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1 Introduction
Modelling uncertainty by means of imprecise - lower or upper - previsions is a
very general approach, encompassing several uncertainty measures as special in-
stances, among them (precise) previsions and probabilities. Although coherence
is probably the most known consistency criterion for imprecise previsions [17],
weaker criteria are also widespread, such as the condition of avoiding sure loss
(ASL) [17], convexity, centered or not [7], and other ones. Even the definition
of coherence is not unique, in a conditional setting: Walley’s coherence [17] and
the broader Williams’ coherence (W -coherence) [18, 19] are the fundamental
ones.
The consistency notions we mentioned share a common structure in their
definitions, going back to de Finetti’s approach to subjective probability [3]:
they require that the supremum of a certain gamble (bounded random number,
in this specific instance called gain) is non-negative, while differing as for the
rules for obtaining the admissible gains. For instance, in the simplest case
that a (precise) probability P is assessed on an arbitrary set of (indicators of)
events D, we say that P is dF -coherent on D if, for all positive n ∈ N, for all






Ei − P (Ei)
)
, (1)
it holds that maxG ≥ 0. (Here supG is attained, as the image set of G is
finite.) The other instances are analogous: in the most general situations we
consider, the gain is a function of a finite number of conditional gambles and
of their (precise, lower or upper) previsions, and is itself a conditional gamble
(cf. the later Definitions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4). Each gain actually has the meaning
of a gain in a betting or behavioural interpretation. Under this interpretation,
the agent assessing the uncertainty evaluation considers (at least hypothetically)
buying/selling operations involving a finite number of events (E1, . . . , En in (1)),
but more generally of conditional gambles (those the gain is a function of) at
prices given by P (E1), . . . , P (En) in (1) or, in general, given by their precise
(P ), lower (P ) or upper (P ) previsions.
With reference to the betting interpretation, the limiting situation maxG
= 0 in (1) is termed Weak Dutch Book (WDB): an agent buying/selling siEi
for siP (Ei), with i = 1, . . . , n, would at best gain nothing, but otherwise lose,
from the global transaction. More generally, we shall denote Weak Dutch Book
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any situation where the supremum of some gain is 0, in the definition of a
consistency concept for imprecise previsions.
WDBs have not been extensively investigated in the literature. Most of the
research focused on WDBs for dF -coherent probabilities, concentrating in the
fifties of the last century, when de Finetti’s theory was getting widespread (cf.
[6, 13]). Often, the perspective was that of trying to avoid WDBs, because
of their counterintuitive behavioural meaning. For this, the notion of strict
coherence was elaborated, but later essentially dropped, being subject to rather
severe restrictions.
Little has instead been written as for the properties of an uncertainty as-
sessment incurring a WDB, even less outside dF -coherence. In particular, the
agent’s beliefs of incurring a real loss were investigated in [2] for dF -coherent
probabilities, and in [15] for (unconditional) coherent lower/upper previsions.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to fill this gap, also extending the
work in [15]. Precisely, we will investigate:
 Basic properties of assessments incurring WDBs
 The implications of a WDB assessment on the agent’s outlooks of escaping
a real Dutch Book (i.e., in general, of avoiding a uniformly negative loss)
 Strict consistency, the generalisation of strict coherence outside dF -coherence.
We shall mainly develop the theory with reference to W -coherence, since this
notion is a rather general one. Moreover, as we shall demonstrate on the way,
the properties ensured by W -coherence may become less significant or vacuous
with weaker notions, such as convexity.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 contains preliminary definitions
and basic results to be applied in the sequel. In Section 3, we first present simple
introductory examples of WDBs, to be rediscussed later. Next we show that if
a WDB is effective for a lower prevision P and some gain G, then P ‘tends’ to
be locally precise. Roughly speaking, we mean with this that the restriction of
P on the set of the conditional gambles in G is subject to certain contraints,
which may be as strong as to require that P is a precise prevision there, in the
case that (the unrestricted) P is a coherent lower prevision. We analyse how
these constraints vary, depending on the degree of consistency of P .
In Section 4 we focus on the relationships between WDBs with W -coherent
previsions and events with positive (lower) probability. The basic result is
Proposition 4.1, ensuring that if sup(G|B) = 0 and P (E|B) = 0, then also
sup(G|B ∧ E) = 0. If E|B is an atom, ω|B, of a partition on which G|B is de-
fined, it follows that G|B assumes its maximum of 0 (at least) at ω|B. Related
facts about maxima or suprema of WDB gains are then explored.
Section 5 is concerned with the implications of the agent’s assessment on
her/his beliefs about incurring a real Dutch Book. Suppose that supG = 0.
In the simpler situation that supG is achieved, i.e. maxG = 0, this means:
which is the agent’s opinion about her/his losing money, i.e. about the event
(G < 0)? (More generally, if supG is not necessarily achieved, losses bounded
3
away from zero are considered, i.e. events (G ≤ −ε), for any ε > 0.) For
a dF -coherent prevision P and a gain G incurring a WDB, it is known that
P (G < 0) = 0 if G has a maximum (more generally P (G ≤ −ε) = 0,∀ε > 0) [13,
15]. We show that these reassuring beliefs are replaced by increasingly weaker
ones when departing more and more from dF -coherence. Our results extend
those in [15] for unconditional lower/upper coherent previsions, by investigating
convex previsions and the conditional case too. Moreover, a number of results
are derived from a more general one, concerning zero supremum gambles, but
independent of WDBs (Proposition 5.3, Corollary 5.1).
In Section 6 strict consistency is defined as a straightforward generalisation
of strict coherence, and it is proven that a W -coherent assessment is strictly
consistent if and only if no non-impossible conditional event is given zero lower
probability (Proposition 6.1). This generalises prior results for dF -coherent
probabilities in [6]. In a second part, we briefly discuss two alternative ap-
proaches to WDBs, the one presented in [16] and that based on desirability. In
Section 7 we present a summarised analysis of the results obtained.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Describing uncertainty
We recall first some familiar concepts for describing uncertainty.
A partition P of the sure event Ω is a set of pairwise disjoint events, termed
(when non-impossibile) atoms, whose logical sum (union, in set-theoretical lan-
guage) is Ω. A random number X is (described by) a map X : P → R, with
image set {X(ω) : ω ∈ P, ω 6= ∅}. The partition P is not unique, for instance
any partition finer than P could equally well be selected to describe the same
X: this is necessary when a single partition describes, at a time, more random
numbers, initially defined on different partitions.
In the sequel we shall consider bounded random numbers, called gambles.
The simplest non-trivial gamble is the indicator IA of an event A: IA(ω) = 1,
if ω ⇒ A, IA(ω) = 0, if ω ⇒ ¬A, ∀ω ∈ P, ω 6= ∅ (the coarsest partition IA is
defined on is {A,¬A}). Shortly, IA is 1 (0) iff event A is true (false). Because
of this one-to-one correspondence, we shall often not distinguish explicitly IA
and A, using the same symbol A for both.
Given a partition P, call L(P) the linear space of all gambles defined on P.
The set of all (indicators of) events in L(P), i.e. the powerset of P, is called
A(P).
Given two events A, B, B 6= ∅, the conditional event A|B can be thought of
(in a logical approach) as true when A and B are true, false when A is false and
B is true, undefined when B is false. Given a partition P and B ∈ A(P)\{∅}, the
conditional partition P|B is P|B = {ω|B : ω ∈ P}. Given a gamble X defined
on P, the conditional gamble X|B is defined on P|B by X|B(ω|B) = X(ω),
∀ω ∈ P : ω ⇒ B (ω 6= ∅). Clearly, X|Ω = X.
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In later computations involving conditional gains we shall use, often implic-
itly, the following identity [2]
f(X1, . . . , Xn)|B = f(X1|B, . . . ,Xn|B), (2)
where f : Rn → R, X1, . . . , Xn are gambles and B is a non-impossible event.
We remark that, for any k ∈ R,
(X ≤ k)|B = (X|B ≤ k) (3)
are two equivalent descriptions of the same conditional event. In fact, (X ≤
k)|B = ∨{ω ∈ P : X(ω) ≤ k}|B = ∨{ω|B ∈ P|B : X(ω) ≤ k} = ∨{ω|B ∈ P|B :
X|B(ω|B) ≤ k} = (X|B ≤ k).
2.2 Evaluating uncertainty
Denote with D an arbitrary non-empty set of possibly conditional gambles.
In the sequel, D will be the domain of a (precise or imprecise) conditional or
unconditional prevision. Any sort of prevision is then an uncertainty measure
µ for the elements of D, µ : D → R. When D is made up of events (conditional
or not) only, we preferably speak of probability instead of prevision.
We recall now the definition of coherence for a precise prevision, termed dF -
coherence to easily distinguish it from other coherence concepts for imprecise
previsions. In the sequel N+ denotes N \ {0}.
Definition 2.1. Given P : D → R, P is a (conditional) dF -coherent prevision












it holds that sup(G|B) ≥ 0.






Xi − P (Xi)
)
(B = Ω), (5)
and consequently the coherence condition reduces to supG ≥ 0.
The condition of dF -coherence allows a betting (or behavioural) interpreta-
tion, where gi = si(Xi − P (Xi)) in (5) is an elementary gain with stake si. It
represents the agent’s gain from buying (if si > 0) or selling (if si < 0) siXi for
siP (Xi). Thus the condition supG ≥ 0 requires that no finite combination of
elementary gains produces an overall uniformly negative gain to the agent. Sim-
ilarly, the generic elementary gain is siBi(Xi−P (Xi|Bi)) in (4): it incorporates
the factor Bi (here Bi stands for IBi), with the meaning that the bet on Xi|Bi
is effective if and only if event Bi turns out to be true. Then, conditioning G on
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B in sup(G|B) ≥ 0 means that only those values of G are evaluated that ensure
that at least one of the bets on Xi|Bi, for i = 1, . . . , n, is effective.
The other consistency concepts we recall here have a similar betting interpre-
tation. Actually, they can be derived from dF -coherence simply by introducing
constraints on the stakes si (and hence, in the betting interpretation, on the
buying/selling operations). Their definitions and a few basic properties are laid
down below, followed by comments on some common features of theirs (for
more on this topic see e.g. [7, 8, 14, 17, 18, 19]). Prior to this, let us recall some
properties of dF -coherent previsions to be employed later on.
Proposition 2.1 ([5, 18, 19]). If P is a dF -coherent prevision on D, then
(a) there exists a dF -coherent extension of P on any D′ ⊇ D.
Moreover, the following properties hold whenever their terms are defined:
(b) P (aX + bY |B) = aP (X|B) + bP (Y |B), ∀a, b ∈ R (linearity).
(c) P (AX|B) = P (A|B)P (X|A ∧B), A ∧B 6= ∅ (product rule).
Definition 2.2 ([8, 18, 19]). Let P : D → R be given.
(a) P is a W -coherent lower prevision on D if, ∀n ∈ N, ∀X0|B0, X1|B1, . . . ,
















it holds that sup(G|B) ≥ 0.
(b) P is a lower prevision that avoids sure loss (ASL) on D if, ∀n ∈ N+,












it holds that sup(GASL|B) ≥ 0.
W -coherence was introduced in [18]; the structure-free form in Definition 2.2
(a) was employed in [8]. In the unconditional case, it is equivalent to Walley’s
coherence [17, Section 2.5.4 (a)], while it includes (strictly) Walley’s definition
of coherence in [17, Section 7.1.4 (b)] in the conditional environment. Hence W -
coherence is a very general coherence concept, while the condition of avoiding
sure loss in Definition 2.2 (b) has a more ancillary role (in the theory and in
this work). It was only implicitly defined in [18], and we term it here ‘avoiding
sure loss’ because it reduces to Walley’s definition of avoiding sure loss with
unconditional previsions [17, Section 2.4.4 (a)]. With conditional previsions, it
generalises instead what Walley names ‘avoiding partial loss’ [17, Section 7.1.2].
We summarise next some fundamental properties of W -coherence.
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Proposition 2.2 ([8, 18, 19]). Let P : D → R be a W -coherent lower prevision
on D. Then
(a) P has a least-committal W -coherent extension E on any D′ ⊇ D, which
is termed natural extension: E = P on D and for every W-coherent
extension P ∗ of P on D′, E ≤ P ∗ on D′.
(b) If, for X|B, Y |B ∈ D, X|B ≤ Y |B, then P (X|B) ≤ P (Y |B) (monotonic-
ity).
(c) P (X|B) ∈ [inf(X|B), sup(X|B)] (internality).1
Proposition 2.3 ([19], Theorem 2 (Envelope theorem)). Given P : D → R, P
is a W -coherent lower prevision on D if and only if there exists a non-empty
set P of dF -coherent previsions on D such that
P (X|B) = min{P (X|B) : P ∈ P}, ∀X|B ∈ D.
Apart from coherence, we shall sometimes employ the consistency notions of
convexity and centered convexity for unconditional lower previsions, developed
in [7].
Definition 2.3 ([7], Definitions 3.1, 3.3). Given P : D → R,
(a) P is a convex lower prevision on D if, ∀n ∈ N+, ∀X0, X1, . . . , Xn ∈ D,
∀si ≥ 0, with i = 1, . . . , n, and
∑n










X0 − P (X0)
)
, (6)
it holds that supGc ≥ 0.
(b) Assuming ∅ ∈ D, P is a centered convex lower prevision on D if it is
convex on D and P (∅) = 0.
Centered convex lower previsions have more satisfactory properties than non-
centered ones (which even fail to ensure the internality property) and are in this
respect closer to coherent lower previsions. This appears also from the following
properties [7].
Proposition 2.4 ([7], Propositions 3.4, 3.5). Let P : D → R be a convex lower
prevision on D. Then
(a) if, for X,Y ∈ D, X ≤ Y , then P (X) ≤ P (Y ) (monotonicity).
(b) Assuming P is also centered on D, it has a least-committal centered convex
extension on any D′ ⊇ D, the convex natural extension Ec: Ec = P on
D, and whatever is P ∗, convex extension of P on D′, Ec ≤ P
∗ on D′.
1 Being also W -coherent, a dF -coherent prevision satisfies properties (b), (c) too.
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Proposition 2.5 ([7], Theorems 3.3, 3.4 (Envelope theorem)). Let P : D → R
be given. Then
(a) P is a convex lower prevision on D if and only if there exist a non-empty
set P of dF -coherent previsions on D and a function α : P → R such that
P (X) = min{P (X) + α(P ) : P ∈ P}, ∀X ∈ D. (7)
(b) P is a centered convex lower prevision on D if and only if (7) holds, with
the additional condition that min{α(P ) : P ∈ P} = 0.
Next to lower previsions, upper previsions could also be assessed. Customar-
ily, it is possible to refer to just one type of imprecise previsions by the conjugacy
relation: P is defined on −D = {−X|B : X|B ∈ D}, by2
P (−X|B) = −P (X|B). (8)
Using (8), the consistency notions we recalled for lower previsions and their
properties can be expressed for upper previsions. For instance,
Definition 2.4 ([8, 18, 19]). Given P : −D → R, P is a W -coherent upper
prevision on −D if, ∀n ∈ N, ∀X0|B0, X1|B1, . . . , Xn|Bn ∈ −D, ∀si ≥ 0, with
















it holds that sup(G|B) ≥ 0.
Assuming D is negation invariant, that is, −D = D, an extreme example
of W -coherent upper (lower) prevision is the upper (lower) vacuous prevision
P v(X|B) = sup(X|B) (P v(X|B) = inf(X|B)), ∀X|B ∈ D. By Proposition 2.2
(c), the couple (P v, P v) maximises the imprecision of the agent’s assessment on
any X|B while being W -coherent, and may express total lack of information
on X|B. At the other extreme, we have a dF -coherent prevision P : in fact,
∀X|B ∈ D, P (X|B) = −P (−X|B) by Proposition 2.1 (b). Thus P is self-
conjugate in (8), or P = P = P .
The various gains we recalled (G,G,GASLGc, G) are gambles themselves,
being functions of a finite number of gambles in D (and, in the conditional case,
of indicators of their conditioning events).
The suprema of these gains may or may not be achieved, but are necessarily
maxima when D is made of simple gambles, i.e., gambles taking only finitely
many distinct values. In particular, this is the case when D is a set of (possibly
conditional) events.
We mention next some other concepts regarding gains for later use.
2 With imprecise probabilities, (8) reduces to P (¬A|B) = 1− P (A|B).
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Definition 2.5. Let G be the gain in Definition 2.2 (a).
Then DG = {X0|B0, X1|B1, . . . , Xn|Bn}, i.e., DG ⊆ D is the set of condi-
tional gambles forming G.
The coarsest partition G|B is defined on is termed PG|B. In other words,
the atoms ω|B of PG|B correspond to the distinct jointly possible values of
X0, X1, . . . , Xn that imply B =
∨n
i=0Bi.
We say that G is a WDB gain if sup(G|B) = 0.
Analogous definitions apply to the other gains we considered. For instance,
if P avoids sure loss (alternatively, is convex) on D, GASL (Gc) is a WDB gain
if sup(GASL|
∨n
i=1Bi) = 0 (supGc = 0).
3 Consistency constraints induced byWeak Dutch
Books
We begin our investigation of WDBs with imprecise previsions presenting a
simple special case in Section 3.1. The examples therein will be useful for
suggesting or illustrating some of the later developments, starting with those in
Section 3.2.
3.1 A special case








E2 − P (E2)
)
(9)
is a gamble defined on the set of all the (non-impossible) events of the partition
PG = {E1 ∧ E2, E1 ∧ ¬E2,¬E1 ∧ E2,¬E1 ∧ ¬E2}. Thus G can take (at most)
the following values:
G(E1 ∧ E2) = s1(1− P (E1)) + s2(1− P (E2)) (10)
G(E1 ∧ ¬E2) = s1(1− P (E1))− s2P (E2) (11)
G(¬E1 ∧ E2) = −s1P (E1) + s2(1− P (E2)) (12)
G(¬E1 ∧ ¬E2) = −(s1P (E1) + s2P (E2)). (13)
To avoid trivial instances, we suppose throughout this section that s1 ·s2 6= 0
and that E1, E2 are possible events (i.e., neither ∅ nor Ω).
We present some instances of WDBs with these assumptions, and varying
consistency requirements for P .
Example 3.1. Let P avoid sure loss on D, and E1 ∧ E2 6= ∅. Then si > 0,
i = 1, 2, in (9) and maxG = 0 if and only if P (E1) = P (E2) = 1.
In fact, it is maxG = G(E1 ∧ E2) = 0 if and only if P (E1) = P (E2) = 1.
We might be tempted to infer from this example that WDBs are strictly
related with extreme probability events. However, in the next Examples 3.2
and 3.3, E1 and E2 are not given extreme probability evaluations.
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Example 3.2. Let P avoid sure loss on D, P (Ei) ∈ ]0, 1[, i = 1, 2. Then G is
a WDB gain if and only if E1 ∧ E2 = ∅, P (E1) + P (E2) = 1 and s1 = s2.
This can be proved as follows. We first assume that maxG = 0. It is clear,
from Example 3.1, that E1 ∧ E2 = ∅ is a necessary WDB condition. Given
that G(¬E1 ∧ ¬E2) < 0 if ¬E1 ∧ ¬E2 6= ∅, it remains to examine G(E1 ∧
¬E2), G(¬E1 ∧E2). Note for this that E1 ∧¬E2 6= ∅, ¬E1 ∧E2 6= ∅, or else we
would obtain E1 = ∅, E2 = ∅, respectively. Since maxG = 0, we have to ask
that G(E1 ∧ ¬E2) ≤ 0, G(¬E1 ∧ E2) ≤ 0, with at least one inequality being an





Substituting s1 in G(¬E1 ∧ E2) ≤ 0, we get easily P (E1) + P (E2) ≥ 1. Since
P (E1) + P (E2) ≤ 1 is a necessary condition for ASL when E1 ∧ E2 = ∅ (cf.
[17, Section 4.6.1]), we conclude that P (E1) + P (E2) = 1. This implies, from
(14), that s1 = s2. Note that it also implies that G(¬E1 ∧ E2) = 0, i.e., G
attains its maximum value 0 at two atoms of PG. The symmetric assumption
that G(¬E1 ∧ E2) = 0 also leads to the same conclusion.
Conversely, the assumptions E1 ∧ E2 = ∅, P (E1) + P (E2) = 1 and s1 = s2
allow to conclude that maxG = max s1(E1 + E2 − 1) = 0.
It is not difficult to check that, besides the cases developed in Examples
3.1 and 3.2, a lower probability P that avoids sure loss originates a WDB on
{E1, E2} in a third instance only, under the assumptions of the present section,
which is item (c) in the next Proposition 3.1.
When P is coherent, next to the previous cases, further WDB opportunities
arise, since (precisely) one between s1 and s2 may be negative. We detail one
such case in the next example.
Example 3.3. Let P be coherent on D. Let s2 < 0 < s1, and P (Ei) ∈ ]0, 1[,
i = 1, 2. Then maxG = 0 if and only if E1 ∧ ¬E2 = ∅, P (E1) = P (E2) and
s1 = −s2.
In fact, recalling (10)–(13), we note that
G(¬E1 ∧ E2) ≤ max{G(E1 ∧ E2), G(¬E1 ∧ ¬E2)} ≤ G(E1 ∧ ¬E2).
Now, let maxG = 0, which implies E1 ∧ ¬E2 = ∅ (or else we would have
G(E1∧¬E2) > 0, a contradiction). This entails, on the one hand, that E1∧E2 6=
∅ and ¬E1 ∧ ¬E2 6= ∅, on the other hand, by monotonicity of P , that
P (E1) ≤ P (E2). (15)
Moreover, maxG = max{G(E1∧E2), G(¬E1∧¬E2)} = 0 iff both G(E1∧E2) ≤ 0
and G(¬E1 ∧¬E2) ≤ 0, with at least one inequality being an equality. Together
with (15), in both cases we deduce that P (E1) = P (E2), s1 = −s2. Conversely,
let E1∧¬E2 = ∅, P (E1) = P (E2), s1 = −s2. Then, maxG = max s1(E1−E2) =
0.
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Comment. In this example too, maxG = 0 is achieved at two distinct atoms
of PG, given by E1 = E1 ∧ E2 and ¬E2 = ¬E1 ∧ ¬E2, since here E1 ⇒ E2. It
follows that the event (G = 0) is equal to E1 ∨ ¬E2, while (G < 0) is equal to
¬E1∧E2. Further, note that P (E1) = P (E2), while E1 may be not equal to E2.
From this, one easily obtains that the coherent extension of P on ¬E1 ∧ E2 is
unique, since P (E2) ≥ P (E1)+P (¬E1∧E2) ≥ P (E1) implies P (¬E1∧E2) = 0.
It can be checked that there are further alternatives to achieve a WDB with
a coherent P . We omit the simple but tedious derivations and summarise the
results in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Let DG = {E1, E2} ⊆ D, where E1, E2 are possible events,
and P be coherent on D. Let s1, s2 ∈ R \ {0} be either both positive or opposite,
and G be given by (9).
Then maxG = 0 if and only if one of the following holds:
 when s1 s2 > 0,
(a) P (Ei)=1, i = 1, 2, E1 ∧ E2 6= ∅, s1 > 0, s2 > 0;
(b) P (Ei) ∈ ]0, 1[, i = 1, 2, E1∧E2 = ∅, P (E1)+P (E2) = 1, s1 = s2 > 0;
(c) E1 ∧ E2 = ∅, and either P (E1) = 0, P (E2) = 1, 0 < s1 ≤ s2 or
P (E1) = 1, P (E2) = 0, 0 < s2 ≤ s1;
 when s1 s2 < 0,
(d) P (E1) = P (E2) ∈ ]0, 1[ and either E1 ∧ ¬E2 = ∅, s1 = −s2 > 0 or
¬E1 ∧ E2 = ∅, s2 = −s1 > 0;
(e) P (Ei) = 1, i = 1, 2, s1 ≥ −s2 and either E1 ∧ ¬E2 = ∅, s2 < 0 < s1
or ¬E1 ∧ E2 = ∅, s1 < 0 < s2;
(f) P (Ei) = 0, i = 1, 2, s1 ≤ −s2, and either E1 ∧¬E2 = ∅, s2 < 0 < s1
or ¬E1 ∧ E2 = ∅, s1 < 0 < s2;
(g) either P (E1) = 0, P (E2) = 1, ¬E1∧E2 6= ∅, s1 < 0 < s2 or P (E1) =
1, P (E2) = 0, E1 ∧ ¬E2 6= ∅, s2 < 0 < s1.
3.2 Local precision properties with Weak Dutch Books
There is an interesting feature of Proposition 3.1 which attracts one’s attention:
in each of its WDBs, P is actually a dF -coherent probability on DG, i.e., it is
precise on DG. This fact is rather straightforward to check by means of well-
known properties of dF -coherent probabilities. Indeed, in (a), (e) and (g) P is
the restriction on PG of a probability P which is dF -coherent on A(PG): put
P (E1 ∧ E2) = 1 in (a) and (e), either P (¬E1 ∧ E2) = 1 or P (E1 ∧ ¬E2) = 1
in (g). Instead, in (b) and (c) P is dF -coherent on PG = {E1, E2,¬E1 ∧ ¬E2},
while in (d) and (f) {E1, E2} forms a monotone family (chain) of events, and dF -
coherent or coherent assignments are indistinguishable there (cf. [4, Proposition
2.10]).
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As we shall see now, the result is more general: it concerns all coherent
lower previsions. However, there is a distinction, as for its extent, between un-
conditional and conditional coherence. Further, WDBs have effects also outside
coherence, but they are not necessarily of the same kind, as shown for convexity
by Proposition 3.5.
Let us start with a W -coherent lower prevision P (·|·). Its properties on those
DG where a WDB holds are investigated in Proposition 3.2 by means of the next
lemma, which does not involve WDBs explicitly.
Lemma 3.1. Let P : D → R be a W -coherent lower prevision. Letting G,B be
as in Definition 2.2 (a), there exists a dF -coherent prevision P̃ on D ∪ {G|B}
such that P̃ ≥ P on D,







P̃ (Xi|Bi)− P (Xi|Bi)
)
P̃ (Bi|B) ≥ 0. (17)
Proof. By Proposition 2.3, there exists a dF -coherent prevision P̃ : D → R
such that P̃ ≥ P on D and P̃ satisfies (16). By (2) and Proposition 2.1 (b), any













In general, we have that, for i = 0, 1, . . . , n,
P̃
(




BiXi|B −Bi|B P (Xi|Bi)
)
= P̃ (BiXi|B)− P (Xi|Bi) P̃ (Bi|B)
= P̃ (Xi|Bi ∧B) P̃ (Bi|B)− P (Xi|Bi) P̃ (Bi|B)
=
(
P̃ (Xi|Bi)− P (Xi|Bi)
)
P̃ (Bi|B) ≥ 0,
using (2) at the first equality, Proposition 2.1 (b) at the second, Proposition 2.1
(c) at the third, and Bi ∧ B = Bi at the fourth. The final inequality ensues
from P̃ ≥ P on D; by (16), it is an equality when i = 0.
From (18) and this derivation, we obtain (17).
Proposition 3.2. Let P : D → R be a W -coherent lower prevision, G,B be as
in Definition 2.2 (a) and such that G is a WDB gain. Suppose B1|B, . . . , Bn|B ∈
D. Define
D+G = {X0|B0} ∪ {Xi|Bi ∈ DG : siP (Bi|B) > 0, for i = 1, . . . , n}.
Then P is dF -coherent on D+G.
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Proof. Let P̃ be the dF -coherent prevision on D ∪ {G|B} in Lemma 3.1, hence
satisfying P̃ ≥ P on D and (16). Since now sup(G|B) = 0, using Proposition 2.2
(c) and Footnote 1 at the first inequality and (17) then, we have





P̃ (Xi|Bi)− P (Xi|Bi)
)





P̃ (Xi|Bi) − P (Xi|Bi)
)
P̃ (Bi |B) = 0. Further, ∀Xi|Bi ∈
D+G \ {X0|B0}, we have P̃ (Bi|B) ≥ P (Bi|B) > 0. These two facts imply that
P (Xi|Bi) = P̃ (Xi|Bi), ∀Xi|Bi ∈ D+G \ {X0|B0}. (19)
Since condition (16) holds too, we conclude that (19) is valid for all Xi|Bi ∈ D+G,
thus P is dF -coherent on D+G.
The condition B1|B, . . . , Bn|B ∈ D in Proposition 3.2 is not overly restric-
tive. If it is not met, we may consider a W -coherent extension P ′ of P on
D′ = D∪{Bi|B : i = 1, . . . , n} and apply Proposition 3.2 to P ′ on D′. However,
the set on which P ′ is dF -coherent depends then on the specific extension, being
minimal when selecting the natural extension.
Rather, the result is subject to a second, more significant restriction. In fact,
note that the inequality P̃ (Bi|B) > 0, needed in the proof of Proposition 3.2, is
guaranteed for Xi|Bi ∈ D+G\{X0|B0} by the hypothesis P (Bi|B) > 0. Thus, as-
suming P (Bi|B) > 0 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for dF -coherence
of P . In other words, P may be dF -coherent on a set larger than D+G when
0 = P (Bi|B) < P̃ (Bi|B) for some Xi|Bi /∈ D+G.
However, the two constraints above are no longer effective in the important
special case that P is unconditional, where Bi = Ω, for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Then
B = Ω as well as Bi|B = Ω, for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, and we may always add Ω to D,
since necessarily P (Ω) = 1. Hence DG = D+G if all the stakes si, for i = 1, . . . , n,
are non-zero. The result specialises to the statement of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. Let P : D → R be an unconditional coherent lower prevision.










X0 − P (X0)
)
, (20)
with s0 ≥ 0, si > 0, for i = 1, . . . , n, {X0, X1, . . . , Xn} = DG ⊆ D, and assume
that G is a WDB gain. Then P is dF -coherent on DG.
Thus a WDB implies a very strong constraint on the restriction on DG of
a coherent lower prevision. We shall see some implications of this fact in the
sequel.
When P satisfies alternative consistency conditions, a WDB implies gener-
ally (but not necessarily) different constraints on P . The situation does not
really change when P avoids sure loss, as now sketched in the conditional case:
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Proposition 3.4. Let P : D → R be a conditional lower prevision that avoids
sure loss. Considering GASL, B as in Definition 2.2 (b), assume that GASL is
a WDB gain. Naming DGASL = {X1|B1, . . . , Xn|Bn} and
D+GASL = {Xi|Bi : siP (Xi|Bi) > 0, for i = 1, . . . , n},
we have that P is dF -coherent on D+GASL .
Proof. In the first part we can adapt the proof of Lemma 3.1. Results in [18]
ensure that there is a dF -coherent prevision P̃ ≥ P on D. Then P̃ (G|B)
is written as in (17) (omitting the term containing s0 in (18) and otherwise
following the same derivation giving (17)), hence P̃ (G|B) ≥ 0.
Now take the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3.2, recalling that
sup(G|B) ≥ P̃ (G|B) is a necessary condition for P to avoid sure loss, too.
Interestingly, assuming that P is convex on D gives rise to a different sort
of constraint for P . This exploits a result similar to Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2. Let P : D → R be an unconditional convex lower prevision.
Letting Gc be as in Definition 2.3 (a), there exist a dF -coherent prevision P̃ on
D ∪ {Gc} and αP̃ ∈ R such that P̃ + αP̃ ≥ P on D,











P̃ (X0)− P (X0)
)
≥ 0. (22)
Proof. The existence of a dF -coherent prevision P̃ on D ∪ {Gc} and αP̃ ∈ R
such that conditions P̃ + αP̃ ≥ P on D and (21) are satisfied is assured by















siαP̃ − αP̃ = 0.
The WDB case is treated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.5. Let P : D → R be an unconditional convex lower prevision,
and Gc as in Definition 2.3 (a) be a WDB gain. Then there exist a dF -coherent




{X0} ∪ {Xi : si > 0, for i = 1, . . . , n}.
Proof. Consider the dF -coherent prevision P̃ on D∪{Gc} and αP̃ ∈ R in Lemma
3.2. From P̃ + αP̃ ≥ P on D, there exist εi ≥ 0 (i = 1, . . . , n) such that
P̃ (Xi)− P (Xi) = −αP̃ + εi. (23)
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Since 0 = supGc ≥ P̃ (Gc) ≥ 0 by internality of P̃ and Lemma 3.2, we get, by
(22) and (21), 0 = P̃ (Gc) =
∑n
i=1 si(P̃ (Xi) − P (Xi)) + αP̃ . Hence, using (23)

















i=1 siεi = 0. Therefore εi = 0 if si > 0, implying the thesis.
Thus, convexity of an unconditional lower prevision P on D implies that P
has a special structure on D+Gc , with WDBs: for each Xi ∈ D
+
Gc
, P differs from
a dF -coherent prevision P̃ by the same constant αP̃ . Perhaps surprisingly, if P
is centered convex, the preceding result does not imply that αP̃ = 0 in all cases,
but only if ∅ ∈ D+Gc . Instead, if P is (convex and) coherent, then necessarily,
comparing Propositions 2.3 and 2.5 (b), αP̃ = 0 and we re-obtain Proposition
3.3 as a special case of Proposition 3.5.3
Lastly, it is interesting to notice that the WDB for the convex (not necessarily
centered) lower prevision P in Proposition 3.5 propagates to precisely the dF -
coherent prevision P̃ in the same Proposition 3.5.
Corollary 3.1. In the assumptions of Proposition 3.5, define the gain GP̃ for
P̃ as in Definition 2.3 (a) replacing P with P̃ . Then supGP̃ = 0.
Proof. It holds that GP̃ = Gc: this follows easily by substituting P = P̃ +
αP̃ into (6) and using
∑n
i=1 si = 1. Then supGP̃ = 0 by the hypotheses of
Proposition 3.5, and clearly GP̃ is an admissible gain for the dF -coherence of
prevision P̃ .
4 Further properties of Weak Dutch Books
In this section further effects of WDBs on the uncertainty assessments in D are
investigated. In particular, their relationships with positive lower probability
events are explored. We start with conditional lower previsions that are W -
coherent in Section 4.1 and discuss then unconditional coherence in Section 4.2.
4.1 W -coherent lower previsions
The following proposition is a basic result for the developments in this and the
next sections.
Proposition 4.1. Let P : D → R be a conditional W -coherent lower prevision,
G, B as in Definition 2.2 (a) such that G is a WDB gain. Then for any
conditional event E|B ∈ D such that P (E|B) > 0, it holds that
sup(G|B ∧ E) = 0.
3With conditional convex lower previsions, a WDB gain determines more complex con-
straints on P , see [1, Proposition 10].
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Proof. If E|B = B|B, i.e., if B ⇒ E, the assertion is trivial. Let then be
B 6⇒ E. Note that P (E|B) > 0 implies that E|B 6= ∅|B, that is, E ∧B 6= ∅.
Given an arbitrary real s > 0, consider the auxiliary gain
G′ = G+ sB
(
E − P (E|B)
)
.
By W -coherence of P , sup(G′|B) ≥ 0. As a first step, notice that
sup(G′|B ∧ E) ≥ 0. (24)
Indeed,
0 ≤ sup(G′|B) = max{sup(G′|B ∧ E), sup(G′|B ∧ ¬E)}. (25)
For any ω ∈ PG′ , with ω ⇒ B ∧ ¬E, we have
G′(ω) = G(ω)− sP (E|B) ≤ sup(G|B)− sP (E|B) = −sP (E|B),
therefore
sup(G′|B ∧ ¬E) ≤ −sP (E|B) < 0. (26)
From (25) and (26), we get 0 ≤ sup(G′|B) = sup(G′|B ∧ E), hence (24) is
effective.
Given this, and since G′|B ∧ E = G|B ∧ E + s(1− P (E|B)), we obtain





that is, sup(G|B ∧E) ≥ −s(1− P (E|B)). The inequality applying to all s > 0,
we deduce
sup(G|B ∧ E) ≥ 0.
On the other hand, sup(G|B∧E) ≤ sup(G|B) = 0. We conclude that sup(G|B∧
E) = 0.
Proposition 4.1 informs us that if there is any event E|B in D which is given
positive lower probability, then the supremum of G|B∧E is zero. In particular,
recall (Definition 2.5) that G|B is defined on the conditional partition PG|B, or
on any P|B, with partition P finer than PG. Hence, if there is ω|B ∈ P|B such
that P (ω|B) > 0, then Proposition 4.1 implies that sup(G|B) = 0 is achieved
(at least) at ω|B, i.e.,
sup(G|B) = max(G|B) = 0 = G|B(ω|B).
The result has the obvious constraint that ω|B, and more generally E|B, must
belong to D. However, it may be the case that E|B /∈ D but the assessment P
implies that E|B is given positive lower probability by anyW -coherent extension
of P on D ∪ {E|B} = D′. Here Proposition 4.1 still applies replacing D with
the larger set D′, which has no effect on the given G|B. One such instance is
described in the next corollary.
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Corollary 4.1. Define P , G, B as in Proposition 4.1 and suppose again that
sup(G|B) = 0. If E∗|B∗ ∈ D, E∗ ⇒ E ⇒ B ⇒ B∗ and P (E∗|B∗) > 0, then
sup(G|B ∧ E) = 0.
Proof. Recalling Proposition 2.2 (b) at the first weak inequality, and the neces-
sary condition for W -coherence P (E|B∗) ≤ P (E|B) if B ⇒ B∗ (cf. [9, Propo-
sition 13]) at the second, we get, possibly considering a W -coherent extension
of P on D ∪ {E|B,E|B∗},
0 < P (E∗|B∗) ≤ P (E|B∗) ≤ P (E|B).
Thus, Proposition 4.1 may be applied, with D replaced by D ∪ {E|B} if E|B /∈
D.
Corollary 4.1 is useful in the common case that D includes the atoms of
some partition P|B∗. Very often B∗ = Ω, because it is customary to assess
our uncertainty judgements on all alternatives of an initial unconditional uni-
verse, possibly next to some conditional assumptions. Often, P also describes
all X|B ∈ D, meaning that all X,B belong to L(P). Such a partition is finer
than PG (or possibly equal to PG in some cases), since PG supports only the
gambles appearing in G. This implies that for any e ∈ P there is one and only
one ω ∈ PG such that e ⇒ ω. We may thus apply Corollary 4.1 to any e ∈ P
such that e ⇒ ω ⇒ B and P (e) > 0 (replace E∗|B∗ and E|B with e = e|Ω
and ω|B, respectively). This procedure may allow us to draw some conclusions
about whether sup(G|B) is achieved, without ever having to explicitly determine
PG|B.
Before analysing further this and some other follow-up of Proposition 4.1, we
notice that this proposition and Corollary 4.1 have implications regarding events
all conditional on the same event B. Since an environment where conditioning
is made on the same event does not differ substantially from an unconditional
setting, we continue our discussion referring to the unconditional case. This
simplifies the notation and makes the understanding of some concepts more
immediate.
4.2 Unconditional coherent lower previsions
In the unconditional case, Proposition 4.1 reduces to
Proposition 4.2. Let P : D → R be an unconditional coherent lower prevision
and G as in Definition 2.2 (a), with Bi = Ω ∀Bi. Let also G be a WDB gain.
Then, for any event E ∈ D with P (E) > 0, it holds that sup(G|E) = 0.
Clearly, G in Proposition 4.2 is a gain concerning the unconditional gambles
X0, X1, . . . , Xn. However, under some specific assumptions, the WDB extends
to conditionals.
Remark 4.1 (A case of WDB propagation). If E is irrelevant to Xi ∈ D,
that is if P (Xi|E) = P (Xi), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, we obtain a WDB propagation to
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conditionals in the assumptions of Proposition 4.2. In fact,




















X0 − P (X0|E)
)∣∣∣E)
and the last expression is the supremum of a gain regarding Xi|E, i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
Similarly, it is easy to check that if P (·) is coherent on {X0, X1, . . . , Xn}
then P (·|E) = P (·) is W -coherent on {X0|E,X1|E, . . . ,Xn|E}.
From Corollary 4.1 and the subsequent discussion, it is patent that the fol-
lowing corollary holds.
Corollary 4.2. Let P : D → R, G be as in Proposition 4.2. Let P ⊆ D be
either PG or a partition finer than PG, e ∈ P, ω ∈ PG be such that e ⇒ ω and
P (e) > 0. Then G(e) = G(ω) = 0.
It ensues from Corollary 4.2 that
Corollary 4.3. Let P , G, P ⊆ D be as in Corollary 4.2, with supG = 0. Let
I 6= ∅ be a set of indexes such that, for all i ∈ I, we have that ei ∈ P and
P (ei) > 0. Then G|
∨
i∈I ei = 0.
Proof. The set of possible values of G|
∨
i∈I ei is {G(ei) : i ∈ I}, which is {0}
by Corollary 4.2.
Let us discuss now in detail the relationship between positive lower probabil-
ity events and suprema of WDB gains. As before, P : D → R is an unconditional
coherent lower probability, G is the gain in Definition 2.2 (a), with Bi = Ω ∀Bi,
and let supG = 0. P denotes a partition finer that PG. Further, let
P = {ω ∈ PG : P (ω) > 0}, N = {ω ∈ PG : G(ω) = 0}. (27)
The following facts are implied by the preceding results:
(a) If there exists e ∈ P such that P (e) > 0, then G achieves its supremum
(at least) at e: supG = maxG = G(e) = 0 (Corollary 4.2).
(b) If supG is not achieved, then necessarily P (ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ PG (Corollary
4.2). Note that there may be some E ∈ D with P (E) > 0, implying
(Proposition 4.2) supG|E = 0, but E /∈ PG.
Further, checking that P (e) = 0, ∀e ∈ P 6= PG does not ensure that
P (ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ PG, not even when P is a dF -coherent probability P . In
this case, for instance, ω may be a logical sum of infinitely many atoms
e ∈ P, but P may be such that P (ω) > 0 = P (e), ∀e ∈ P, e⇒ ω.
(c) Conversely, if P (ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈ PG, then supG may or may not be achieved.
We exemplify both instances.
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Example 4.1. Let X be defined on P = {ωn : n ∈ N+} by X(ωn) = 1n ,
∀n ∈ N+. P is given on P ∪ {X} by P (ωn) = 0, ∀n ∈ N+, and P (X) =
0 = inf X. Hence P is coherent, being the vacuous lower prevision. The
gain G = −(X − 0) = −X is such that PG = P. Moreover G(ωn) = − 1n ,
∀n ∈ N+, hence supG = 0 is not attained.
Example 4.2. Modify Example 4.1 by adding ω0: P = {ωn : n ∈ N}. Let
X(ω0) = 0, P (ω0) = 0, while X and P are defined as before elsewhere,
and again G = −X, so that PG = P. Then P is still vacuous, hence
coherent, on P ∪ {X}, but now supG = maxG = G(ω0) = 0.
(d) Considering (27), P ⊆ N , by Corollary 4.2. It is P = N in the next Ex-
ample 4.3, but the inclusion may be strict, as in the previous Example 4.2,
where P = ∅, N = {ω0}.
On the one hand, this means that the cardinality of P is a lower bound to
the number of atoms of PG where supG is achieved. On the other hand,
it holds that the cardinality of P contributes to determine that of N , but
may generally be not the only cause. We show in Example 4.4 that the
choice of the stakes may be influential too.
Example 4.3. Let P satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 3.1 (b), see
also the corresponding Example 3.2. We see that PG = {E1 ∧ ¬E2 =
E1,¬E1 ∧ E2 = E2,¬E1 ∧ ¬E2}. We can easily extend P to PG noting
that, since P (E1) + P (E2) = 1, P (¬E1 ∧ ¬E2) = 0 is its unique coherent
extension on PG. Doing so, N = {E1, E2} = P, given that G(¬E1 ∧
¬E2) < 0.
Example 4.4. Let D = {E1, E2,¬E2,¬E1∧E2}, with E1∧¬E2 = ∅, and
P : D → R be the vacuous lower probability. With DG = {E1, E2}, we
know from Proposition 3.1 (f) that maxG = max(s1(E1 − 0) + s2(E2 −
0)) = 0 if s2 < 0 < s1, s1 ≤ −s2. Here PG = {E1,¬E2,¬E1∧E2}, P = ∅,
while there are one or two atoms of PG where G attains its maximum
0, according to whether, respectively, s1 < −s2 or s1 = −s2. In fact
G(E1) = s1 + s2 ≤ 0 if and only if s1 ≤ −s2, in particular G(E1) = 0 if
and only if s1 = −s2, G(¬E2) = 0, G(¬E1 ∧ E2) = s2 < 0.
(e) (dF -coherent probabilities.) In the special case that a dF -coherent prob-
ability P is assessed on D, then PG is necessarily finite, hence G has a
maximum.
Further, if there is a unique ω̃ ∈ PG such that G(ω̃) = 0, then P (ω̃) = 1
(by Corollary 4.2: P (ω) = 0 for all ω 6= ω̃, or else G(ω) would be zero
too). Then, every event in DG = {E1, . . . , En} has extreme probability.
In fact, ω̃ = E′1 ∧ . . .∧E′n, where E′i may be either Ei or ¬Ei. If E′i = Ei,
ω̃ ⇒ Ei and P (Ei) = 1, otherwise P (¬Ei) = 1 and P (Ei) = 0.
If instead P is not concentrated on just one atom of PG, G is not unimodal.
19
Testing Weak Dutch Books. If it is not known whether, given a coherent P ,
supG = 0 or not, we can try to rule out the possibility of a WDB by checking
the sign of G at some ω ∈ PG such that P (ω) > 0 (if any). In fact:
 if G(ω) > 0, then obviously supG > 0;
 if G(ω) < 0, then supG > 0 by Corollary 4.2.
This method is very simple, but allows no conclusion when G(ω) = 0. In fact,
it is clearly possible that G(ω) = 0 and supG = 0, but even when G(ω) = 0
for all ω ∈ PG such that P (ω) > 0, supG may be strictly positive. The next
example illustrates this case.
Example 4.5. Let P = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, X,Y two gambles in L(P) defined by
X(ω1) = Y (ω1) = −1, X(ω2) = Y (ω2) = 1, X(ω3) = α > β = Y (ω3). The dF -
coherent P defined on P by P (ω1) = P (ω2) = 12 , P (ω3) = 0 has a unique dF -
coherent extension on P ∪{X,Y } given by the expectations of X,Y , respectively,
i.e., P (X) =
∑3
i=1 P (ωi)X(ωi) = 0, and similarly P (Y ) = 0. Defining G =
X − Y , we have PG = P, P = {ω1, ω2}, G(ω1) = G(ω2) = 0, but maxG =
G(ω3) = α− β > 0.
5 Vulnerability to Dutch Books in the agent’s
evaluations
To introduce the main topic of this section, let us first consider the simplest
WDB instance: an agent assesses a dF -coherent probability P such that maxG =
0 for some G in (1). This means that when betting in favour or against all events
Ei in DG with the given P (Ei) and stakes si, the agent is certain to lose or at
best gain nothing from the overall bet, whatever happens (lose-or-draw case).
But which are the agent’s beliefs about bearing a loss, i.e., about suffering from
a real Dutch Book? It was proven in [2, Section 9.5.4] that then P (G < 0) = 0.
This result is very reassuring: even though the agent cannot win, she/he is
nearly sure not to lose, in the sense that the probability of bearing a loss is zero.
The same problem, of detecting the agent’s loss prospects with a WDB gain,
has been investigated in [15] for unconditional dF -coherent and coherent lower
or upper previsions, proving the next two propositions:
Proposition 5.1. Given a dF -coherent prevision P on D, let the WDB gain
G be as in (5). Then, (any dF-coherent extension of) P is such that
(a) P (G ≤ −ε) = 0, ∀ε > 0;
(b) if in addition X1, . . . , Xn are all simple, we also have that P (G < 0) = 0.
4
4The dF -coherent extension of P is mentioned explicitly because (the indicators of) the
events (G ≤ −ε) and (G < 0) need not belong to D. Similar specifications will be omitted in
the following propositions.
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Proposition 5.2 (Coherent lower/upper previsions). Given an unconditional
coherent lower prevision P (alternatively, an unconditional coherent upper pre-
vision P ) on D, let the WDB gain G be given as in Definition 2.2 (a), with
Bi = Ω ∀Bi (alternatively, let G =
∑n
i=1 si(P (Xi)−Xi)− s0(P (X0)−X0) be
a WDB gain). This implies that
(a) P (G ≤ −ε) = 0 (P (G ≤ −ε) = 0), ∀ε > 0;
(b) if X0, X1, . . . , Xn are all simple, P (G < 0) = 0 (P (G < 0) = 0).
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 entail the following important facts:
 With dF -coherent previsions (rather than probabilities), the WDB gain
may fail to achieve its supremum of 0. If this is the case, the agent’s
assessment implies that, for any ε > 0, the event (G ≤ −ε) is given
zero probability. This means that any loss bounded away from zero is
given zero probability by the agent. When X0, X1, . . . , Xn are simple (in
particular, when they are (indicators of) events), there is ε > 0 such that
(G ≤ −ε) = (G < 0), and the stronger implication that any loss must be
given zero probability applies.
 The situation is the same with coherent lower/upper previsions (versus
probabilities), as for the losses that are given an uncertainty evaluation
of zero. However, the fundamental dissimilarity with precise assessments
arises that this evaluation is now a lower probability.
With reference to the facts just described, in the sequel we shall term Dutch
Book the occurrence - whatever happens - of a loss bounded away from 0, or
simply of a loss, when X0, X1, . . . , Xn in the WDB gain are simple.
It is significant that the lower probability, but no longer the probability, of
a Dutch Book is zero with coherent imprecise previsions. It means that with
imprecise evaluations we have a generally weaker feeling that a Dutch Book will
be avoided.
In this section, we analyse further the implications of a WDB assessment for
the agent’s Dutch Book evaluations. Precisely:
(a) We show that several such implications are entailed by a more general
property of zero supremum random numbers, not explicitly involving WDBs.
In particular, we deduce from this property a result analogous to Propo-
sition 5.2 for conditional W -coherent lower previsions.
(b) We discuss further the agent’s evaluations of Dutch Books. The strength of
opinions about avoiding losses is dependent on the degree of consistency of
the initial uncertainty assessment, and becomes even weaker with convex
or centered convex previsions.
The starting point for (a) is the following general property:
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Proposition 5.3. Let X|B,Z|B : P|B → R be two conditional random num-
bers, with sup(X|B) = 0, sup(Z|B) < +∞. Suppose that there exist ε > 0, δ > 0
such that
X|B(ω|B) ≤ −ε if and only if Z|B(ω|B) ≥ −δ, ∀ω|B ∈ P|B.
Then there exists s̄ > 0 such that, ∀s ∈ ]0, s̄],
sup(X + sZ|B) < 0. (28)
Proof. Define
A+ = {ω|B ∈ P|B : X|B(ω|B) > −ε} = {ω|B ∈ P|B : Z|B(ω|B) < −δ},
A− = {ω|B ∈ P|B : X|B(ω|B) ≤ −ε} = {ω|B ∈ P|B : Z|B(ω|B) ≥ −δ}.
The set A+ is never empty, since sup(X|B) = 0, whilst A− might be empty or
not. In any case, A+ ∩A− = ∅, A+ ∪A− = P|B.
Now take any ω|B ∈ P|B. Two alternatives (at most, in the case A− 6= ∅)
may occur:
(a) ω|B ∈ A+.
Since then Z|B(ω|B) < −δ, we get ∀s > 0




(X + sZ|B) ≤ −sδ < 0, ∀s > 0. (29)
(b) (A− 6= ∅ and)ω|B ∈ A−.
Now X|B(ω|B) ≤ −ε, while Z|B(ω|B) ≥ −δ.
(b1) If Z|B(ω|B) = −δ,
X + sZ|B(ω|B) ≤ −ε− sδ < −sδ, ∀s > 0. (30)





we have that s̄ > 0. Further, for any s ∈ ]0, s̄],
X + sZ|B(ω|B) = X|B(ω|B) + sZ|B(ω|B)





≤ −ε+ s̄(sup(Z|B) + δ)− sδ
= −ε+ ε− sδ = −sδ.
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From the derivations above we may conclude that:
• If, for any ω|B ∈ P|B, case (a) or possibly (b1) apply, while (b2) does not,
i.e. if A− is either empty or such that Z|B(ω|B) = −δ, ∀ω|B ∈ A−, any
arbitrary positive real number may be chosen as s̄. This satisfies (28) (cf.
(29),(30)).
• If, for at least one ω|B ∈ P|B, case (b2) applies, s̄ is given by (31). This
ensures that (28) holds when s ∈ ]0, s̄].
Proposition 5.3 specialises into the next corollary when Z|B is simple, i.e.,
assumes finitely many distinct values. Note that the statement of the corollary
is derived from that of Proposition 5.3 by putting δ = 0 there.
Corollary 5.1. Let X|B,Z|B : P|B → R be two conditional random numbers,
with sup(X|B) = 0 and Z|B simple. If there exists ε > 0 such that
X|B(ω|B) ≤ −ε if and only if Z|B(ω|B) ≥ 0, ∀ω|B ∈ P|B,
then there is s̄ > 0 such that, ∀s ∈ ]0, s̄], sup(X + sZ|B) < 0.
Proof. If min(Z|B) ≥ 0, then, ∀δ > 0, ∀ω|B ∈ P|B,
Z|B(ω|B) ≥ −δ iff Z|B(ω|B) ≥ 0 iff X|B(ω|B) ≤ −ε, (32)
and Proposition 5.3 may be applied to give the thesis.
If min(Z|B) < 0, then the event B ∧ (Z < 0) is non-impossible. Hence we
may consider the gamble Z|B∧(Z < 0), which is simple and thus has a negative
maximum that we term −γ:
max(Z|B ∧ (Z < 0)) = −γ < 0.
Hence, ∀ δ ∈ ]0, γ[, ∀ω|B ∈ P|B, it holds that Z|B(ω|B) ≥ −δ iff Z|B(ω|B) ≥ 0.
Using the hypothesis, we can extend this equivalence to get (32) and apply again
Proposition 5.3.
Corollary 5.1 plays a key role in the proof of the following proposition, gen-
eralising Proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.4. Given a W -coherent lower prevision P (alternatively, a W -
coherent upper prevision P ) on D, let G,B be as in Definition 2.2 (a) such that
G is a WDB gain (let G,B be as in Definition 2.4 such that G is a WDB gain).
Then, for any W -coherent extension of P (still termed P )
(a) P (G|B ≤ −ε) = 0 (P (G|B ≤ −ε) = 0), ∀ε > 0;
(b) if DG (DG) is made of simple conditional gambles, P (G|B < 0) = 0
(P (G|B < 0) = 0).
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Proof. Proof of (a). Let P be a W -coherent lower prevision. By contradiction,
suppose that P (G|B ≤ −ε) > 0 is a W -coherent extension of P , for some ε > 0.
Because of this, and noting that (G|B ≤ −ε) = (G ≤ −ε)|B (see (3)), we obtain













I(G≤−ε) − P (G ≤ −ε|B)
)
|B,
we deduce that, for all ω|B ∈ P|B,
 if G|B(ω|B) > −ε, then Z|B(ω|B) = −P (G ≤ −ε|B) < 0;
 if G|B(ω|B) ≤ −ε, then Z|B(ω|B) = 1− P (G ≤ −ε|B) ≥ 0.
Therefore, G|B(ω|B) ≤ −ε if and only if Z|B(ω|B) ≥ 0, ∀ω|B ∈ P|B. Recalling
also that sup(G|B) = 0 by assumption, Corollary 5.1 may be applied to G|B










contradicting (33). Thus, necessarily, the first equality in (a) holds.
To prove the second, by (8) write G as a gain concerning the conjugate P










−X0 − P (−X0|B0)
)
.
Then apply the first equality of (a).
Proof of (b). It is sufficient to observe that X0|B0, X1|B1, . . . , Xn|Bn being
simple, G|B (G|B) is simple too. Therefore there exists ε > 0 such that (G|B ≤
−ε) = (G|B < 0) (and similarly for G|B).
The extent of Proposition 5.4 is perfectly analogous to that of Proposition
5.2: when sup(G|B) = 0 (sup(G|B) = 0), the agent’s beliefs on D, if elicited by
a W -coherent lower or upper prevision, imply that her/his lower probability of
a real Dutch Book is 0.
However, the upper probability of a Dutch Book is not necessarily 0, and
may reasonably be even 1. Consider for this the next simple example (extending
Example 1 in [15]).
Example 5.1. Let D = {X|B}, where X|B is a simple non-constant condi-
tional gamble. Put P (X|B) = min(X|B). If n = 0, s0 > 0 in Definition 2.2
(a), the gain G|B = −s0B(X −min(X|B))|B = −s0(X|B−min(X|B)) is such
that max(G|B) = 0. It is coherent to assess P (G|B ≤ −ε) = 1, for any ε > 0
such that min(G|B) ≤ −ε < 0. In fact (cf. Footnote 2), this is equivalent
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to extending P on D′ = {X|B} ∪ {(G|B > −ε) : ε ∈ ]0,−min(G|B)]}, let-
ting P (G|B > −ε) = 0. The extension is W -coherent, being the vacuous lower
prevision on D′.
Since there is ε′ ∈ ]0,−min(G|B)] such that (G|B ≤ −ε′) = (G|B < 0), it is
coherent to assume P (G|B < 0) = 1. It is also intuitively sound: the only start-
ing assignment on D, P (X|B) = min(X|B), is lower vacuous and compatible
with the absence of any significant information on X|B. Quite reasonably then,
the agent’s opinion about bearing or not a Dutch Book may be vacuous too.
We point out that Example 5.1 shows that also the upper probability about
bearing any loss (P (G|B ≤ −ε)) may be non-zero, and even 1.
From these remarks and Proposition 5.4, we may conclude that the (condi-
tional) p-box of a WDB gain G|B for a W -coherent P has a special structure, as
for its lower distribution function F (x) = P (G|B ≤ x), x ∈ R. F is a single-step
function, identically equal to 0 for any x < 0, to 1 for any x ≥ 0. On the con-
trary, the upper distribution function F (x) = P (G|B ≤ x), x ∈ R, is essentially
unconstrained and need not coincide with F (x) if (G|B ≤ x) is a non-trivial
event.
Given that P (G|B < 0) need not be 0 when G|B is a simple gamble, one
may wonder whether it is at least always possible to put P (G|B < 0) = 0 or
more generally (for an arbitrary G|B) P (G|B < −ε) = 0, if wished. The answer
is negative even in an unconditional environment, as shown next.
Proposition 5.5. Let P : D → R be an unconditional coherent lower prevision,
and G defined by (20), with si > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, be a WDB gain. Then
(a) if DG = D, it is coherent to put P (G ≤ −ε) = 0, ∀ε > 0;
(b) otherwise this choice may be incoherent.
Proof. By conjugacy, P (G ≤ −ε) = 1−P (G > −ε), hence we may equivalently
evaluate the coherence of the extension P (G > −ε) = 1.
Proof of (a). If D = DG, then P is a dF -coherent prevision on D by
Proposition 3.3. As such, it allows a dF -coherent extension (still termed P ) on
D ∪ {G ≤ −ε,G > −ε}. Since necessarily P (G ≤ −ε) = 0 by Proposition 5.1,
P (G > −ε) = 1 by dF -coherence of P .
Proof of (b). A counterexample suffices to prove (b). For this, a simple idea
is to fix ε such that (G > −ε) = (G = 0), and that this event already belongs to
D, but is not given lower probability 1. Let then D = {E1, E2, E1 ∨¬E2}, with
E1 ∧ ¬E2 = ∅ (hence E1 ⇒ E2), P (E1) = P (E2) = p ∈ ]0, 1[, P (E1 ∨ ¬E2) =
1− ε, ε ∈ ]0, 1− p[.
 P is a coherent lower probability on D. In fact, P is the lower envelope
(on D) of the dF -coherent probabilities P1, P2:
E1 ¬E1 ∧ E2 E2 ¬E2 E1 ∨ ¬E2
P1 p 0 p 1− p 1
P2 p ε p+ ε 1− (p+ ε) 1− ε
P p p 1− ε
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 On DG = {E1, E2}, P may induce a WDB for a convenient G: this is
precisely the case of Example 3.3 in Section 3.1.
 Yet, (G = 0) cannot be given lower probability 1, because here (G = 0) =
E1∨¬E2 ∈ D (cf. the comment following Example 3.3) and P (E1∨¬E2) =
1− ε.
It is easy to check that a result analogous to Proposition 5.1 applies to
dF -coherent conditional previsions:
Proposition 5.6. Let P be a dF -coherent prevision on D, and let G,B be as
in Definition 2.1. Then
(a) P (G|B ≤ −ε) = 0, ∀ε > 0;
(b) if X1|B1, . . . , Xn|Bn are simple gambles, P (G|B < 0) = 0.
The proof replicates that of Proposition 5.4 with obvious substitutions (re-
place G, B, P with G,
∨n
i=1Bi, P , respectively) and is therefore omitted. Thus,
an agent assessing a precise rather than an imprecise coherent evaluation is more
confident to avoid a Dutch Book, and assumes that this is an event of zero (pre-
cise, rather than lower) probability.
The strength of the agent’s beliefs about avoiding a proper Dutch Book de-
pends therefore on the degree of consistency of her/his uncertainty assessments.
In fact, weaker concepts than (W -)coherence may allow for even weaker
implications about the occurrence of Dutch Books. In particular, centered con-
vexity is a notion not too far from coherence for many aspects. Yet, in the case
of a WDB with a centered convex lower prevision P , the agent may have no
real convictions that a Dutch Book associated with the gain G will be avoided,
as not even P (G ≤ −ε) may be forced to be zero. We show this in the next
example.
Example 5.2. Let D = {∅, E1,¬E1∧E2, E2}, with E1 ⇒ E2 (E1 6= E2). Given
P such that P (∅) = 0, P (E1) = P (E2) = p ∈ ]0, 1[, P is clearly centered convex
(even coherent) on {∅, E1, E2}. Consider first the following question: which are
the possible assignments for P (¬E1∧E2) such that P is a centered convex lower
probability on D? The answer is:
P (¬E1 ∧ E2) ∈ [0,min{p, 1− p}]. (34)
In fact, 0 = P (∅) ≤ P (¬E1 ∧ E2) ≤ P (E2) = p, by Definition 2.3 (b) and
Proposition 2.4 (a). Moreover P (¬E1 ∧ E2) ≤ P (¬E1) ≤ 1 − P (E1) : the
first inequality is again due to Proposition 2.4 (a), the second holds because P ,
being centered convex, avoids sure loss [7, Proposition 3.5 (e)] and therefore the
condition P (¬E1) ≤ 1− P (E1) applies [17, Section 4.6.1]. Further, the bounds
in (34) can be achieved: this can be seen using Proposition 2.5. For instance,
if 1 − p ≤ p, P is centered convex on D putting P (¬E1 ∧ E2) = 1 − p, as P is
then the lower envelope on D of P1 + α1 and P2 + α2, with P1, P2 dF -coherent
probabilities, α1 = 0, α2 = p (as in the following table).
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E1 ¬E1 ∧ E2 E2 ∅ ¬E2
P1 = P1 + α1 p 1− p 1 0 0
P2 0 0 0 0 1
P2 + α2 p p p p 1 + p
P p 1− p p 0
It can be checked similarly that the extensions P (¬E1∧E2) = 0 and, alternatively
and if p < 1 − p, P (¬E1 ∧ E2) = p ensure centered convexity of P on D too.
Moreover, P (¬E1 ∧E2) may take any value in [0,min{p, 1− p}] by [10, Lemma
1].
Now consider the admissible gains for P on DG = {E1, E2}. Among such
gains, we find the WDB gain G in Example 3.3 (which, putting s1 = −s2 = 1,
reduces to a gain for testing convexity of P ). Further, we know (see the comment
following Example 3.3) that the event (G < 0) is equal to the event ¬E1 ∧ E2.
From all this, we deduce that:
 If P is originally assessed only on {∅, E1, E2}, then P (G < 0) = P (¬E1 ∧
E2) may be given by (34) any value in [0,min{p, 1− p}] while preserving
centered convexity.
 If P is already assessed on D, with P (¬E1 ∧ E2) 6= 0 while satisfying
(34), then its convex natural extension Ec on (G < 0) is not 0 (being
P (¬E1 ∧ E2) itself). This follows from Proposition 2.4 (b).
Thus, if an uncertainty assessment incurs a WDB, the agent’s opinion about
avoiding a real Dutch Book depends on the degree of precision of the consistency
notion the assessment satisfies. The self-protection offered by the dF -coherence
is maximal, whilst it becomes vacuous with convexity. Even if centered, con-
vexity does not guarantee that Ec(G ≤ −ε) may be 0.
6 Hedging Weak Dutch Books
Next to their axiomatic meaning, the definitions of dF -coherence, W -coherence
and other ones recalled in this paper may be given a betting interpretation
which, in our view, should represent more a way of eliciting beliefs than a
real-life betting scheme. It is anyway hard to explain why WDBs should be
acceptable, on the basis of pure betting argumentations. In fact, the problem
of hedging WDBs was perceived soon after de Finetti’s theory of coherence
became widespread enough. Because of this, the oldest hedging idea was (and
still largely is) confined to the realm of (precise) probabilities.
6.1 Strict consistency
The idea we just mentioned is the most obvious, and radical, solution: redefine
coherence so that WDBs are ruled out. The modified coherence concept is
termed (nowadays) strict coherence, and replaces the condition supG ≥ 0 with
supG > 0, for any admissible G 6= 0.
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The approach may be straightforwardly extended to a generic uncertainty
measure µ to which some betting scheme applies:
Definition 6.1. Let µ : D → R be an uncertainty measure, whose consistency
requires that sup(G|B) ≥ 0 for any conditional gain G|B admissible according
to certain rules. Then µ is strictly consistent if, for each such G|B, either
G|B = 0 or sup(G|B) > 0.
Strict coherence for (precise) probabilities was discussed as early as the mid-
fifties of the last century in [6, 13]. Both papers identify a condition necessary for
strict coherence, and [6] proves its sufficiency, jointly with some conditions for
non-strict coherence. In today’s language, we would express the strict coherence
condition for a probability P by asking that P (E) = 1 if and only if E = Ω.
Note that this is equivalent to requiring that P (E) = 0 if and only if E = ∅
(this is the form we shall employ later). Kemeny in [6] referred to conditional
events too, but the approach to conditional coherence in [6] was still not quite
focused. The case of conditional coherence was hinted in [18] and is dealt with
in the next proposition, characterising strict consistency for W -coherent lower
previsions, which we term strict W -coherence.
Proposition 6.1. Let P : D → R be a W -coherent lower prevision. Then,
(a) If P is strictly W -coherent on D,
P (A|B) > 0, for all events A|B ∈ D, A|B 6= ∅|B. (35)
(b) If P is not strictly W -coherent on D and, for any WDB gain G|B 6= 0
as in Definition 2.5, there exists ε > 0 such that (G|B ≤ −ε) ∈ D is
non-impossible,
∃A|B ∈ D, A|B 6= ∅|B : P (A|B) = 0. (36)
Proof. Proof of (a). By contradiction, let A|B ∈ D be such that A|B 6= ∅|B and
P (A|B) = 0 (hence A ∧ B 6= B, otherwise P (A|B) = 1). Then a WDB arises
for G|B = −B(A− 0)|B (it is a special case of Example 5.1). As a consequence
P is not strictly W -coherent on D, contradicting the assumption.
Proof of (b). Let P be not strictly W -coherent (but W -coherent) on D.
Hence, there exists a conditional gain G|B 6= 0 such that sup(G|B) = 0 (Defi-
nition 6.1). Take ε > 0 such that (G|B ≤ −ε) ∈ D is non-impossible. Then, by
Proposition 5.4, P (G|B ≤ −ε) = 0. This proves the thesis, with (G|B ≤ −ε)
playing the role of A|B in (36).
When D has a special structure, consistency of P on D may be characterised
by some axioms. In such a case, strict consistency may be also characterised
by the additional axiom (35), by Proposition 6.1. For instance, consider an
unconditional coherent P defined on L(P). The set L(P) is large enough to
satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 6.1 (b). Coherence of P is equivalent there
to P (X) ≥ inf X, ∀X ∈ L(P), and to its positive homogeneity and superlinearity
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[17, Theorem 2.5.5], hence strict coherence is characterised by the additional
axiom (35) (where B = Ω). For lower previsions defined on L(P) or other
special sets, the characterisation of strict W -coherence in Proposition 6.1 gets
explicitly closer to results known for dF -coherence [6, 13]. This time any non-
impossible event must be given a lower rather than precise positive probability.
However, the crucial point is that even W -coherence does not significantly
relax the tight constraints of strict coherence already known for dF -coherence.
Suppose that D ⊇ P, with P a partition of (unconditional) events. Then P can
be at most denumerable for strict W -coherence. In fact, given a W -coherent
P , since by Proposition 2.3 there exists a dF -coherent P ≥ P on P, positivity
of P (ω) for more than countably many ω ∈ P implies P (ω) > 0 for the same
atoms. This is known to contradict dF -coherence of P .
Thus, strict (W -)coherence is confined to a denumerable environment, but
already Shimony observed in [13] that a finite setting would often be more
appropriate. This would avoid unbalanced evaluations, i.e., those concentrating
most of the probability in the denumerable case on a finite number, hence on
‘few’, atoms.
Because of its severe constraints, strict coherence has generally not been
considered a satisfactory solution against WDBs for precise assessments, nor
can it play a more significant role with W -coherence, as we have just seen.
6.2 Other approaches
Alternative ways of tackling WDBs are based rather on the interpretation of
coherence for lower previsions. Take the most investigated case of dF -coherent
previsions: instead of saying that P (X) is the price an agent would accept for,
indifferently, either buying or selling X, we may interpret P (X) as both an
infimum selling price and a supremum buying price for X. That is, the agent
would be committed to buy (sell) X at any price lower (higher) than P (X),
but not necessarily at P (X). In this way the agent would avoid in practice any
WDB. For, separating the bets where the agent buys some gambles from those
















with m + r ∈ N+, s1, . . . , sm, t1, . . . , tr ≥ 0 (and not all zero). Then, for all













(P (Xj) + ε)−Xj
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j=1 tj) > 0,
∀ε > 0. Thus the agent avoids the WDB.
The argument just described is essentially due to [16], which discusses dF -
coherent probabilities. However, the underlying interpretation of suprema buy-
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ing/selling prices goes back to [17] and applies to lower/upper previsions too.
Hence the argument could be generalised to imprecise evaluations.
While this solution does not really cancel WDB gains, as they remain possi-
bilities to consider at least at a theoretical evaluation level, a second alternative
based on desirability is more sophisticated with respect to this. In fact, here
a coherent set of desirable gambles D is defined by means of axioms. One of
these axioms, termed avoiding partial loss, requires that if a gamble X is such
that supX ≤ 0, X 6= 0, then X /∈ D. Accepting this axiom clearly rules out
WDBs (i.e., a WDB gain does not belong to D). Yet, a weaker notion of de-
sirability has also been considered in the literature which relaxes precisely this
axiom, thus not necessarily ruling out WDBs. Hence, the agent may choose
whether or not WDB gains may be considered (at least marginally) desirable.
In both instances, a correspondence between coherent sets of desirable gambles
and unconditional coherent lower previsions may be set up. See [11, 12] for more
information on desirability. See also [19, Section 5.2] for a discussion about the
avoiding partial loss axiom and its relaxation in a conditional setting.
Lastly, a further dimension has to be hinted, that of real-world betting. It
is easy to understand that WDBs have very little room here, if any. In fact,
theoretical uncertainty models only partly fit with the needs of professional bet-
tors (and institutions acting as bettors in some sense, like insurance companies).
The prices for buying/selling gambles proposed by such agents cannot be dF -
coherent previsions, since the expected gain from any dF -coherent combination
of bets is known to be zero. Coherent lower or upper previsions are more ad-
equate, with some restrictions (see the discussion in [15, Section 4]). However,
a professional agent will typically aim at positive enough expected gains. Thus
even bets whose net gain is expected to be positive, but too close to zero, could
be ruled out, even when the gain might be desirable in a theoretical view. It is
easily realised then that a WDB gain will not be considered, its expectation be-
ing non-positive. We may conclude that the occurrence of WDBs in real-world
is essentially occasional.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored properties of imprecise uncertainty assessments
incurring WDBs, according to their consistency requirements. By contrast,
much of the previous work focused on dF -coherent probabilities. This study
is justified also because, as appears from the late Section 6.1, even weakening
dF -coherence to Williams’ coherence does not broaden significantly the range
of strict consistency, the radical alternative for avoiding WDBs. Thus a WDB
is something to coexist with, also in an imprecise setting.
On the other hand, the occurrence of WDBs is not an issue if the various
consistency definitions (W -coherence, convexity, . . . ) are viewed axiomatically.
Note that even classical probabilities defined by Kolmogorov’s axioms may incur
WDBs, without this fact ever being noticed within that theory. The same
argument applies to other non-behavioural theories of uncertainty.
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Moving from precise to imprecise assessments reveals an interesting feature
of WDBs, i.e., their tendency to ‘local precision’ investigated in Section 3. This
surprising property cannot obviously be detected with assessments which are
already precise, while the demonstrated dependence of local precision on the
required degree of consistency is something one can more easily account for.
Other explored facets of WDBs regard their relationships with positive (lower)
probability events (Section 4), and their implications on the agent’s beliefs about
suffering from real losses (Section 5). It seems that several such results do not
generalise to weaker requirements than W -coherence. For instance, the proofs
of Propositions 4.1 and 5.4 have no straightforward adaptation to convex previ-
sions, because they do not ensure the convexity constraint in Definition 2.3 for
some relevant gains (such as G′ in the proof of Proposition 4.1).
Actually, a more detailed study of WDBs in such instances could be part of
future work, as well as an investigation of the connection between WDBs and
other notions, such as arbitrage or desirability.
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